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ABSTRACT
This article fundamentally challenges the way in which law currently regulates hu-
man health research. It invokes the anthropological concept of liminality—the
quality of in-between-ness—to suggest deeper ways of understanding ongoing
challenges in delivering acceptable and effective regulation of research involving
human participants. In stark contrast to the structural regulatory spaces con-
structed by law, the metaphor of the liminal space is explored to explain what is lost
through our failure to see health research regulation as an inherently human expe-
riential process, involving potentially profound transformative events for partici-
pants and researchers alike. The implications for the future of health research
regulation are then examined. In particular, the analysis calls into question key fea-
tures of the current regulatory paradigm, and demands that we reconsider our own
demands of law in this context. The argument is made that health research is a limi-
nal process and that we fail to treat it as such. This requires a rethink of corollary
regulation also in processual terms. Ultimately, the charge is to undertake a radi-
cal reimagining of regulatory space to accommodate and promote liminal regulatory
spaces.
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I . INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING REGULATORY SPACE IN
HEALTH RESEARCH
The metaphor of the ‘regulatory space’1 is now commonly invoked to describe the
metaphysical environment occupied by institutional actors and bounded by law. It de-
lineates a sphere of inﬂuence and control over many human endeavours in a diverse
range of contexts. This is equally true in the realm of health research regulation, where
we have witnessed a burgeoning of legal and quasi-legal interventions in recent de-
cades, nationally and internationally, and sadly too often driven by public scandals or
moral panics. To take the British and European context as an example, the UK was
the ﬁrst country anywhere to regulate the creation, storage, and use of human em-
bryos through the introduction of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (HFE)
Act 19902 in the wake of the birth of the ﬁrst so-called test-tube baby. This now repre-
sents the most comprehensive licensing and inspectorate regime in the world under
the auspices of the HFE Authority. Importantly, it has also served as something of a
template for regulatory regimes that followed. For example, the UK instituted the lab-
yrinthine Human Tissue Act 2004 with its associated licensing Authority as a direct
result of the Bristol and Alder Hey organ retention scandals that arose from sub-
optimal (or non-existent) consent practices relating to forensic and research uses of
deceased children’s tissues. This regulatory endeavour replaced one legislative instru-
ment of four sections with a new law 25 times its length.3 Arising in parallel have
been European and other supranational inﬂuences. Thus, within the European Union,
the UK and its 27 fellow Member States must comply with the new Clinical Trials
Regulation,4 the Data Protection Directive with respect to data use for research (to be
replaced by the General Data Protection Regulation),5 medical devices directives
(also en route to Regulation status),6 and hybrid provisions such as Advanced
Therapy Medicinal Products (ATMPs: similarly subject to centralised legislative re-
form).7 A multiplicity of regulators attach to these legislative structures creating not
only a highly complex and tightly regulated landscape, but also an associated
1 See, in particular, R Baldwin, M Cave and M Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice
(2nd edn, OUP 2012) and F Vibert, The New Regulatory Space: Reframing Democratic Governance (Edward
Elgar 2014).
2 Substantially amended and extended in 2008 through the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008.
3 See GT Laurie and SHE Harmon, ‘Through the Thicket and Across the Divide: Successfully Navigating the
Regulatory Landscape in Life Sciences Research’ in E Cloatre and M Pickersgill (eds), Knowledge,
Technology and Law (Routledge 2015) 121.
4 Council Regulation (EU) 536/2014 of 16 April 2014 on clinical trials on medicinal products for human
use, and repealing Directive 2001/20/EC [2014] OJ L158/1.
5 Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the pro-
cessing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/31. The General Data
Protection Regulation was adopted by the Council of the EU on 8 April 2016 and by the European
Parliament on 14 April 2016. Content and legislative history here: < http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-pro
tection/reform/index_en.htm> accessed 30 April 2016.
6 Council Directive 90/385/EEC of 20 June 1990 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States re-
lating to active implantable medical devices [1990] OJ L189/17; Council Directive of 93/42/EEC concern-
ing medical devices [1993] OJ L169/1; and Council Directive of 27 October 1998 on in vitro diagnostic
medical devices [1998] OJ L331/1. Proposals for reform can be followed here: <http://ec.europa.eu/
growth/sectors/medical-devices/index_en.htm> accessed 30 April 2016.
7 Council Regulation 1394/2007 of 13 November 2007 on advanced therapy medicinal products and amend-
ing Directive 2001/83/EC and Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 [2007] OJ L324/121. Proposals for reform
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taxonomy of regulated ‘objects’ such as ‘data’, ‘tissue’, ‘embryos’, ‘devices’, ‘ATMPs’,
and ‘clinical trials’, each bounded by its own legal deﬁnition and bespoke sets of regu-
latory rules of production, storage, use, and market approval.
This pattern of command-and-control regulation8 whereby a state authority has
dominant oversight and power over health research is repeated throughout the western
world and beyond. It is also often driven by legal instruments that adopt a similar
‘bounded object’ approach, that is, where law creates artiﬁcial constructs that become
the object of regulatory attention of dedicated regulators who operate within legally de-
ﬁned spheres of inﬂuence or ‘silos’.9 At the risk of caricaturing the law in health research,
the regulatory paradigm is nevertheless commonly typiﬁed by a central role for, and
demand on, the law to establish and dictate regulatory practices in an increasingly silo-
dependent manner. It is manifestly the case that health research is subject to closer scru-
tiny than at any time in human history. But where is the ‘human’ in this story? Why are
the literatures and the media replete with concerns about a lack of trust in health re-
search or uses of human materials and data despite this plethora of regulation?10
Most recently, the UK Care Act 2014 now requires eight leading regulators and
government bodies to work together under the oversight of the Health Research
Authority towards ‘co-ordinating and standardising practice relating to the regulation
of such research’,11 while having regard for the need:
a. to protect participants and potential participants in health or social care research
and the general public by encouraging research that is safe and ethical, and
b. to promote the interests of those participants and potential participants and the
general public by facilitating the conduct of such research.12
The adoption of this latest piece of legislation is clear recognition that the research
enterprise continues to operate sub-optimally despite considerable advances in human
rights, ethical discourse, public engagement, and reﬂexive governance. This raises im-
portant questions about how the 2014 Act might actually deliver on its stated objec-
tives. It is noticeable that recourse to law remains utterly central to the delivery of
health research regimes.13 However, a central premise of this article is to suggest that
the legally centric approach thus perpetuated is problematic.
can be followed here: <http://ec.europa.eu/health/human-use/advanced-therapies/index_en.htm> ac-
cessed 30 April 2016.
8 For a discussion of top-down governmental approaches and a range of alternatives, see C Lyall,
T Papaioannou and J Smith (eds), The Limits to Governance: The Challenge of Policy-Making for the New Life
Sciences (Ashgate 2009).
9 See, eg the Council of Europe, Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine: Oviedo Convention
(4 April 1997), and the increasingly legalistic World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical
Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects (10th edn, 2013).
10 Classically, see O O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (CUP 2002). More recently, see, G Laurie and
others, A Review of Evidence Relating to Harm Resulting from Uses of Health and Biomedical Data (Nufﬁeld
Council on Bioethics 2015), available at: <http://nufﬁeldbioethics.org/project/biological-health-data/evi
dence-gathering/> accessed 30 April 2016.
11 s 111(1).
12 s 111(2).
13 This is true both of hard law features, such as those discussed in the text, and soft laws such as the myriad
guidance documents from professional bodies such as the British Medical Association and General Medical
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The article proceeds as follows: Section II examines what the current construction
of regulatory space in health research actually delivers, as driven by law. It offers the
example of the care.data initiative involving unwarranted uses of citizens’ health data
to suggest that there are many reasons to be wary of reliance on law to legitimise
health research practices; Section III then develops an alternative analysis of these
practices through the anthropological lens of liminality. It is argued that the human
experiences within regulated spaces matter. Moreover, the literature on liminality
helps us to think about those spaces in radically different ways—notably as processes
of transformation and change—and with important consequences for health research
regulation; Section IV offers a range of examples that show why this perspective mat-
ters; ﬁnally, Section V invites the reader to reconceive the research enterprise as in-
volving liminal regulatory spaces, and the consequences of this are fully explored.
I I . WHAT IS THE RESEARCH ‘PROBLEM’ WITH HEALTH RESEARCH
REGULATION?
It is a misnomer to talk about the regulatory space in health research. The ‘bounded
object’14 approach to regulation mentioned in Section I has arisen partly because of
piecemeal developments over the past 70 years, partly because of the diverse agenda
of multiple national and supranational actors with authority to act, and partly because
of serial knee-jerk reactions to moral panics, such as Alder Hey and Bristol. It has a
number of unlooked-for consequences. First, it creates a series of legal silos where reg-
ulation occurs in largely disconnected ecosystems;15 thus, ‘data’ are subject to one re-
gime while ‘tissues’ are subject to another, and ‘embryos’ to yet another, and so on.
Secondly, and relatedly, this not only fails to reﬂect the reality of research practice –
i.e. tissues are of value precisely because they reveal valuable data – but it also makes a
mockery of any notion of a uniform and unitary regulatory space.16 There is, instead,
a multiplicity of spaces ostensibly engaged in the same endeavour but with little
means to learn lessons between them.17 Thirdly, this potentially militates against the
efﬁciency and proportionality of regulatory oversight in complex research protocols,
that is, when research straddles different regulatory regimes and involves multiple
Council, as well as practice statements or Standard Operating Procedures from regulators, such as the
Health Research Authority. A more recent phenomenon has witnessed increased interest from funders,
such as the Wellcome Trust and the Economic and Social Research Council, through the issuing of guid-
ance on what they expect of researchers in ethical terms.
14 This is not to be confused with the concept of ‘boundary objects’, see S Leigh Star, ‘This is Not a Boundary
Object: Reﬂections on the Origin of a Concept’ (2010) 35 Sci, Technol & Human Values 601.
15 The term ‘ecosystem’ is used here as a shorthand to encompass the complex network of actors and evolu-
tionary dynamics that typify and drive forward a particular sector of activity. It is a term that is deployed in
health research policy circles; see, for example, JN Thompson and J Moskowitz, ‘Preventing the Extinction
of the Clinical Research Ecosystem’ (1997) 278(3) J Am Med Ass 241, and M Swan, ‘Crowdsourced
Health Research Studies: An Important Emerging Complement to Clinical Trials in the Public Health
Research Ecosystem’ (2012) 14(2) J Med Internet Res Mar-Apr: e46.
16 See also, LA Bygrave, ‘Information Concepts in Law: Generic Dreams and Deﬁnitional Daylight’ (2015)
35(1) OJLS 91.
17 This is not to deny the considerable efforts of regulators to devise memoranda of cooperation to work bet-
ter together, for example Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Human Tissue Authority
and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (2013), available at: < http://www.hfea.gov.uk/
docs/HFEA_HTA_MoU_and_JWP.pdf> accessed 30 April 2016.
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agents and regulators. Embryonic stem cell research is an example of this.18 Lastly,
and most importantly, this approach makes the ‘object’ and not the ‘subject’ the pri-
mary focus of regulatory attention.19 That is, the experiences of the research partici-
pant qua being a (research) subject are neither fully captured nor necessarily
accommodated by the regulatory regimes.20 While it is shown below that laws do, of
course, seek to protect research participants’ rights and interests, it is often forgotten
that there are other subjects involved in the research enterprise too, not least re-
searchers and regulators. Yet, regulatory attention is neither overtly nor systematically
directed at their experiences, and we must ask if something is lost as a result.
As suggested immediately above, it is undeniable that serious efforts have been
made to put research participants more at the heart of the research enterprise. The
most obvious example of this is the primacy of consent in today’s legal research re-
gimes. There is, nonetheless, a disjunct between consent that operates as a quasi-
legalistic waiver of rights akin to the one-off signing of a contract, and consent as a
process through which participants might be able to exercise continuing control.21
Albeit that there has been discussion in the literature about consent as process,22 this
still suggests that consent operates in a largely instrumental fashion. There remains a
serious lack of understanding about what experiences these appeals to consent repre-
sent, or even mask, in terms of what it is like to be—or to become—a research
participant.
Additionally, the consent paradigm is largely individualistic in outlook, especially as
established within human rights frameworks focussing on rights and interests. This
sits at odds with the objectives of many health research regimes that are community-
focused and usually premised on some form of altruism in terms of what they expect
of participants. Indeed, Thomassen and others remind us that the term ‘interests’
stems from the Latin words ‘inter’ and ‘esse’: in-betweenness as between beings. The
notion of interests refers to that which lies between, or happens between, beings or
being: ‘it is a “being in between”.’23 According to Thomassen, and following Girard,24
‘. . . what we want, what we desire, happens between human beings. The value of an
object lies not in its intrinsic qualities, but in how that object is viewed by more than
one subject’.25 This implies that neither the notion of the rights holder nor the focus
on the bounded regulatory object fully or accurately capture what is happening in
18 T Caulﬁeld and others, ‘The Stem Cell Research Environment: A Patchwork of Patchworks’ (2009) 5(2)
Stem Cell Rev 82.
19 Compare the US National Research Act 1974, in which ‘research subjects’ are legal constructs.
20 For discussion of a possible ontological trend in other literatures, see S Woolgar, ‘The Wrong Bin Bag:
A Turn to Ontology in Science and Technology Studies?’ (2013) 43(3) Social Studies of Science 321.
21 G Laurie and E Postan, ‘Rhetoric or Reality: What is the Legal Status of the Consent Form in Health-
related Research?’ (2013) 21(3) Med L R 371.
22 For example, DC English, ‘Valid Informed Consent: A Process, Not a Signature’ (2002) Am Surgeon 45,
and P Allmark and S Mason, ‘Improving the Quality of Consent to Randomised Controlled Trials by Using
Continuous Consent and Clinician Training in the Consent Process’ (2006) 32 J Med Ethics 439.
23 B Thomassen, Liminality and The Modern: Living Through the In-Between (Ashgate 2014), 220, citing A
Horvarth,Modernism and Charisma (Palgrave MacMillan 2013) 195, and H Wydra, ‘The Liminal Origins of
Democracy’ (2009) 2(1) International Political Anthropology 91.
24 R Girard, Violence and the Sacred (Johns Hopkins University Press 1979) provided a sweeping account of
mimetic desire in ancient and more recent cultures.
25 Thomassen (n 23) 220.
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human health research. It suggests that our current approach to human health re-
search is ‘. . . inherently problematic because it fails to treat the anthropological di-
mension in any serious way.’26
In contrast to what is said above about diverse regulatory silos, there are nonetheless
examples across regimes of similar or common approaches to regulation. An example in
the data and tissue regimes has been the emergence of the so-called ‘consent or anonym-
ise’ approach. This adopts a binary either/or model of regulation whereby the protection
of research participants’ rights and interests is considered to be satisﬁed either by seeking
consent to data/tissue use, or by anonymising data/tissue to minimise the likelihood of
identiﬁability (and so reduce threats to privacy). This regulatory approach has been sub-
jected to sustained critique in other contexts both for its failure effectively to protect re-
search subjects,27 and for the limiting effects it can have on the execution of robust
research.28 The novel point for present purposes is, however, with respect to the repeti-
tion of the approach across regulatory spheres: it suggests that there can be a tendency
across regimes to reproduce or mimic regulatory responses without due attention as to
whether a regulatory device that is ﬁt for one context is also appropriate in another.
Taken together, these observations suggest that, despite the central role of law in
driving research practices, law’s regimes do not capture the experience of becoming
someone involved in research. Thus, when we ask the earlier question, where is the ‘hu-
man’ in this story about human health regulation?, we currently receive an incomplete
answer. This is worrying and unacceptable because, from the human perspective, the
process of becoming a research participant is a change of status, potentially in very
profound ways.29 Individuals, their bodies, body parts, and other intimate adjuncts
such as personal data, are instrumentalised to varying degrees. The core question,
then, is: if we see involvement in research as a change in status as human beings, what
might that mean for our understandings of health research regulation?
A recent example of regulatory failure helps to bring all of this into stark relief and
strongly suggests that a new focus on the human experience of being involved in
health research is both vitally important and urgently required.
A. care.data: Where is the ‘human’ in Human Health Research?
The care.data initiative was introduced in England under the umbrella of the
Health and Social Care Act 2012 which set up the Health and Social Care
Information Centre (HSCIC) to receive individual level patient data from GP
surgeries. The aim was to deliver six key commissioning and service objectives, in-
cluding ‘economic growth, by making England the default location for world-class
health services research’.30 In a version of the ‘consent or anonymise’ paradigm,
26 ibid 221.
27 P Ohm, ‘Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization’ (2010) 57
UCLA Law Rev 1701, and more recently Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics, The Collection, Linking and Use
of Data in Biomedical Research and Health Care: Ethical Issues (Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics: London,
2015), paras 4.15–4.29.
28 W Lowrance, Privacy, Conﬁdentiality and Health Research (CUP 2012), and R Al-Shahi and C Warlow,
‘Using Patient-Identiﬁable Data for Observational Research and Audit’ (2000) 321 BMJ 1031.
29 The fact that this might not be important to some people, subjectively, is not the point at issue.
30 NHS England and others, Frequently Asked Questions: care.data Guide for GP Practices, (2013).
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patients were not asked for consent, and instead data would be used in anony-
mised form as the default.31 Where this was not possible, approval was to be
sought from the Conﬁdentiality Advisory Group, also operating under legal au-
thority,32 to authorise identiﬁable, non-consented uses ‘in the public interest’.33
Furthermore, the NHS Constitution was amended in 2012 to provide for the ini-
tiative, notably through restatement of the claim that it served a public interest,
and a ‘pledge’ to inform NHS patients about research studies for which they
might be eligible. Leaﬂets were sent to 26.5 million households, although not ad-
dressed to individuals qua patients; moreover, this information contained no di-
rect mention of care.data.
Within weeks of its launch care.data was suspended in February 2014 amid vocifer-
ous patient and professional objections about lack of transparency and robust over-
sight, as well as concern about inadequate information on possible uses and disclosure
of data, especially to commercial entities. Elsewhere, it has been suggested that a par-
tial explanation for this reaction is a lack of ‘social licence’, ie the assumption of a man-
date for action must accord with the general expectations of society, and it is
dangerous to attempt to borrow this wholesale from one context to another.34 In the
case of care.data, the trust within the GP-patient relationship and the basis upon which
health research is otherwise conducted could not be assumed to translate to a top-
down, faceless, bureaucratic enterprise.
Notwithstanding, even if this explanation holds true, it only provides a partial pic-
ture because it addresses only a community-based response. To be more complete,
we require both an individual-level and a community-level human experiential explana-
tion. It is in this respect that the anthropological concept of liminality can greatly
deepen our understanding, not only of an initiative like care.data but also of the dy-
namics of human health research more generally.
I I I . LIMINALITY
The concepts of ‘liminality’ and ‘liminal space’ were ﬁrst developed by the anthropolo-
gist Arnold van Gennep in his seminal work, Rites of Passage, published in French in
1908. In a veritable tour de force across human history and cultures, van Gennep pos-
ited that it is a universal constant when human beings transition from one social status
to another—for example, from childhood to adulthood, singledom to married life,
and even life to death—that a pattern always occurs that involves three distinct stages:
. . . the [i] rites of separation from a previous world, preliminal rites, those executed
during the [ii] transitional stage liminal (or threshold) rites, and the [iii] ceremonies of
incorporation into the new world post-liminal rites.35
31 To be speciﬁc, data could be identiﬁable while used in the HSCIC but it would not be disseminated in iden-
tiﬁable form.
32 NHS Act 2006, s 251.
33 ibid.
34 P Carter, GT Laurie and M Dixon-Woods, ‘The Social Licence for Research: Why care.data Ran into
Trouble’ (2015) 41 J Med Ethics 404.
35 A van Gennep, The Rites of Passage (University of Chicago Press 1960) 21. Emphasis as in original text.
Liminality and the Limits of Law in Health Research Regulation • 7
Van Gennep was interested in the form of this schema,36 and notably with the limi-
nal—the in-between—stage, which acquires ‘. . . a certain autonomy’.37 The term de-
rives from the Latin for threshold, ‘limen’. It signiﬁes the crossing of a threshold and a
change of status for the person concerned. Moreover, as van Gennep observed:
‘[s]uch changes of condition do not occur without disturbing the life of society and
the individual, and it is the function of rites of passage to reduce their harmful
effects.’38
Thus, the importance of rites of passage emerges as a means to manage transitions
through liminal periods and spaces. A central feature of such processes is the role of
an independent actor to guide those persons experiencing liminality through the limi-
nal phase and out the other side. This role has been referred to variously as a Master
of Ceremonies39 or the Representative of Order.40 Stenner and Moreno-Gabriel point
out why this is so important in terms of the subjective experiences of the people
concerned:
Moments of “becoming” are literally formative experiences in which subjectivity
itself acquires a new pattern. . . any social artiﬁce of staging does not contradict
the authenticity of experience: the more important and emotionally real the
event, the greater the need for a carefully staged structure to “occasion” the ex-
periences. In the absence of such patterning devices, liminality can be chaotic,
messy, dangerous and destructive. Instead of being a formative experience, emo-
tional transitions can be de-forming.41
Albeit that van Gennep developed his work on liminality in the context of tribal socie-
ties,42 its enduring relevance to modern mass societies has been forcefully and con-
vincingly argued by a number of key contributors since the 1960s,43 when van
Gennep’s work was translated into English and picked up by British anthropologist
Victor Turner.44 One of Turner’s key contributions to liminality, set within the
36 ibid 189: ‘Forms [of rites of passage] often vary, but the function is similar.’
37 ibid x.
38 ibid 13.
39 A Szakolczai, ‘Liminality and Experience: Structuring Transitory Situations and Transformative Events’ in A
Hovarth, B Thomassen and H Wydra (eds), Breaking Boundaries: Varieties of Liminality (Berghahn Books
2015) 18.
40 P Stenner and E Moreno-Gabriel, ‘Liminality and Affectivity: The Case of Deceased Organ Donation’
(2013) 6 Subjectivity 229.
41 ibid 241.
42 It is crucial to recognise the work of critical anthropologists in the post-colonial and capitalist industrial era
who have highlighted the importance in ethnographic writing ‘ . . . [to] struggle self-consciously to avoid
portraying abstract . . . a-historical “others”’, see J Clifford, ‘On Ethnographic Authority’ (1983) 2(1)
Representations 118, 119. See also, J Clifford and GE Marcus, Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of
Ethnography (University of California Press 1986).
43 See, generally, the works discussed in sub-Section III.B below.
44 V Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (Aldine Transaction 1969). See also, beyond the
tribal studies context, V Turner, From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play (PAJ Books 1982),
V Turner, The Anthropology of Performance (PAJ Books 1986), BC Alexander, Victor Turner Revisited: Ritual
as Social Change (1991) and G St. John, Victor Turner and Contemporary Cultural Performance (Berghahn
Books 2008).
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culturally transformative late 1960s, was to suggest that in liminal spaces people are
released from social structures, and anti-structure takes over. As he described it:
The attributes of liminality or of liminal personae (‘threshold people’) are neces-
sarily ambiguous, since this condition and these people elude or slip through the
network of classiﬁcations that normally locate states and positions in cultural
space. Liminal entities are neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between
the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and
ceremonial.45
For Turner,46 and others,47 the liminal space can be a moment of opportunity where
pre-existing norms and constraints no longer apply. In particular, prior formal struc-
ture is often replaced by a sense of communitas among persons in a liminal state:
. . . [A]t certain life crises such as adolescence, the attainment of elderhood, and
death, varying in signiﬁcance from culture to culture, the passage from one struc-
tural status to another may be accompanied by a strong sense of
‘humankindness’, a sense of the generic bond between all members of society –
even in some case transcending tribal or national boundaries – regardless of
their subgroup afﬁliations or incumbency of structural positions.48
We return to the signiﬁcance of this below.
For sociologist Arpad Szakolczai, van Gennep’s work on rites of passage and
Turner’s insights about structure and anti-structure are profound:
Rites of passage have a simple and clear but by no means trivial structure,
according to van Gennep and Turner, who draw on evidence from practically all
the cultures of the planet. The core substance of Turner’s proposition is that
this structure is the key to the structure of human experience.49
The crucial point is that, when considered objectively as perspectives on human expe-
riences, the claim in much of the anthropology literature is that liminality reveals
something universal about the human condition. This article does not suggest that any
such omnipresent truth exists, nor does it seek evidence of this; rather it deploys this
‘myth’50 about the human experience to cast new light on the roles and limits of law
in health research. It is on this basis that we can consider what liminality might teach
about the medico-legal world.
45 Turner, The Ritual Process, ibid 95.
46 ibid.
47 See generally, all materials referenced in n 23.
48 Turner, The Ritual Process, (n 44) 116.
49 A Szakolczai, ‘Liminality and Experience: Structuring Transitory Situations and Transformative Events’
(2009) 2(1) International Political Anthropology 141, 147.
50 I borrow here from the work of Peter Fitzpatrick on ‘law as a matter of myth’ in P Fitzpatrick, The
Mythology of Modern Law (Routledge 1992). I am grateful to one of the anonymous referees for bringing
this work to my attention.
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A. Liminality in the Medico-Legal World
An easily recognised example of where the myth of liminality helps us to understand
the medico-legal context is the well-developed concept of the ‘mature minor’. This no-
tion was ﬁrst laid down by the House of Lords in the famous case of Gillick v West
Norfolk & Wisbeck Area Health Authority.51 The essential legal dilemma was this: to
what extent, if at all, ought the law recognise the growing autonomy of a child as she
or he nears adulthood and with respect to intimate decisions about their own bodies?
In this particular case, could a doctor lawfully prescribe contraception to a teenage
child without informing the parents or seeking their consent? In developing the no-
tion of the ‘mature minor’, the House of Lords offered a qualiﬁed Yes in answer to
this question. The concept is subject to a ﬁve-point test the details of which are not
necessary for present purposes because the overall approach is largely framed by:
(i) sufﬁcient maturity by the child to understand the nature and consequences of
what was proposed, and (ii) an assessment by the relevant health care professional
that the intervention and independent act was in the child’s own best interests. Thus,
the mature minor is neither a child to be treated wholly in her own best interests, nor
an autonomous adult at liberty to choose or refuse medical care at will. Indeed, it has
frequently been conﬁrmed that refusal by a mature minor can be overridden by re-
sponsible parents or the courts,52 in contrast to the absolute right to refuse of compe-
tent adults.53
The present analysis strongly suggests that the young person in such cases is
experiencing a liminal phase of their life; they are literally passing through a temporary
state of being where established legal regimes are disrupted and called into question.
Law’s attempt to construct the status of the mature minor is, in turn, an attempt to give
effect to the liminal experience. The value of this way of understanding what is happen-
ing has been largely lost on the majority of critics of the Gillick case. Many of the criti-
cisms suggest that the House of Lords failed to recognise a binary consent-refusal
power that apparently emerges in an instant.54 Liminality offers a very different explana-
tion. Crucially, liminality is normally a transitory occasion and characterised by uncer-
tainty. This helps to explain why law and society often struggle with how to deal with
the mature minor.55 The explanatory power of liminality is well illustrated by this exam-
ple. Key features are: (i) the focus on the experience of the subject as between states of
being, (ii) the acknowledgement of the temporary nature of the experience—the person
is passing through—as well as the transformative nature of the experience, at least in
terms of legal status,56 and (iii) by implication, the attention is on the process itself.
51 [1986] AC 112 (HL).
52 See Re R (a minor)(wardship: medical treatment) [1992] Fam 11 and Re W (a minor)(medical treatment)
[1992] 4 All ER 627.
53 Re T (adult)(refusal of medical treatment) [1992] 4 All. ER 649, together with Re MB (an adult: medical treat-
ment) [1997] 8 Med LR 217.
54 See for example, S Elliston, The Best Interests of the Child in Healthcare (Routledge 2007).
55 Compare J Tripp and R Viner, ‘Sexual Health, Contraception and Teenage Pregnancy’ (2005) 330 BMJ
590, and R Taylor, ‘Reversing the Retreat from Gillick? R (Axon) v Secretary of State for Health’ (2007) 19
CFLQ 81.
56 Building on the point noted in n 29, it is important not to suggest that the subjective experience of the sub-
ject is necessarily transformative for them.
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In other health-related contexts, the potential value of insights about liminality has
been recognised by various non-legal social science disciplines, notably by researchers
seeking to understand the experience of disease-onset,57 ill-health,58 survival beyond
disease, 59 and even with respect to end of life and palliative care.60 For example, en-
gaging the group-based communitas idea spoken of above by Edith Turner, Froggatt
has argued that:
[ T]he hospice movement . . . by creating an alternative place to die outside the
dominant health care system, could also be considered to have established meta-
phorically liminal institutions where communitas may be experienced.61
However, what we do not have to date is a deep analysis of the value of liminality in
understanding research participation, nor of the role of law in support of, or in facili-
tating, such practices.
B. Deepening the Analytical Potential of Liminality
In offering such an enquiry, this article reﬂects the work of Thomassen who has re-
cently written on liminality in modern society.62 He encourages us to recognise limi-
nality and liminal spaces where they occur and for their shared properties, and to
grasp the fuller and deeper meaning of their existence, with all that this entails.63
Thomassen highlights, in particular, that liminality has both temporal and spatial ele-
ments. Thus, for example, it can exist as a mere moment, over a sustained period, or
into epochs, and it can occur in speciﬁc places or with respect to speciﬁc objects, in-
cluding the human body. It can occur in closed areas or institutions, and in larger ter-
ritories within, and even beyond, entire countries. In all cases, it can be experienced as
much by individuals, as by groups, and/or by societies at large. As an example of the
last, Thomassen offers the 18th century Lisbon earthquake, which was a natural disas-
ter of such tremendous proportions that it led to a rupture with old European ways of
thinking about the world, necessitating radical reforms of urban planning and renewed
humility of man about his own progress and attempts at dominion over nature.64
57 K Martin-McDonald and D Biernoff, ‘Initiation into a Dialysis-dependent Life: An Examination of Rites of
Passage’ (2002) 29(4) Nephrology Nursing Journal 347.
58 M Little and others, ‘Liminality: A Major Category of the Experience of Cancer Illness’ (1998) 47(10)
Social Science and Medicine 1485, and K Thompson, ‘Liminality as a Descriptor for the Cancer Experience’
(2007) 15(4) Illness, Crisis and Loss 333.
59 E Blows and others, ‘Liminality as a Framework for Understanding the Experience of Cancer Survivorship:
A Literature Review’ (2012) 68(10) J Advanced Nursing 2155.
60 H Braude, ‘Normativity Unbound: Liminality in Palliative Care Ethics’ (2012) 33 Theor Med Bioeth 107.
61 K Froggatt, ‘Rites of Passage and the Hospice Culture’ (1997) 2(2) Mortality 123, 127.
62 Thomassen (n 23), carves out both a narrow and wide conceptualisation of liminality. The narrow is the sense
of the middle stage of life’s passages as identiﬁed by van Gennep, while the wider notion ‘ . . . captures some-
thing essential about the imprecise and unsettled situation of transitoriness’. Here he cites Horvarth (n 23) 10.
63 As he states, (n 23) 38: ‘Liminal spaces and moments are key to personal and social development, anywhere
in the world. It is via the liminal that persons and groups are taken apart, recomposed and regenerated.’
Moreover, he continues, sagely: ‘van Gennep was right.’
64 ibid 94–99.
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The same might be true of the global threat from pandemics today.65 Such an analysis
also helps us to understand socio-legal responses to medico-moral panics as processes
that almost demand change and transformation from previously prevailing circum-
stances. This is particularly important for the law, because the law is often called-upon
to lead society out of a particular crisis. We have seen this all too often in the health
research arena, as Section I of this article demonstrates. But even if this is so, what
does the recognition of the existence of liminality tell us about the process of moving
forward—either as individuals or as a collective? In particular, how can it be that limi-
nality can encompass both moments of opportunity (Turner) and moments of crisis
(Thomassen)?
Thomassen suggests that here we require further anthropological concepts to re-
veal the ‘analytical potential of liminality’.66 Building on Szakolczai,67 he offers three
that can be characterised as:
• imitation (mimesis),
• deception (trickster), and
• division (schismogenesis).
The claim is that the uncertain and ambiguous nature of a liminal state of affairs ex-
poses three particular dangers: (i) a tendency towards unreﬂexive imitation and imita-
tive behaviour or patterns in the absence of a clear path to follow out of liminality;68
(ii) a risk that a ‘shaman of the liminal’—a trickster—will present themselves to ex-
ploit the situation, claiming to lead the way to salvation but for nefarious ends:69 this
is an important counterpoint in mass societies to how liminality presents in tribal soci-
eties—as indicated above, normally rites of passage have a Master of Ceremonies to
guide initiands out of the liminal void but if there is no obvious Master of
Ceremonies, the risk of exploitation is heightened; and (iii) there is a ﬁnal risk that
the transformative process will not be completed because of the (negative) cumulative
interaction between parties: this can result in either a state of permanent liminality
where a state of crisis is perpetuated, or the incorporation of a ‘schism’ into society it-
self at the re-integration phase and a ‘splitting off’ of groups.70
This suggests that liminality can produce both negative and positive group-based
experiences. The risk of ‘schism’ is clearly negative and could signal the end of any
well-intentioned legal or regulatory plan for society. In stark contrast, Victor Turner’s
identiﬁcation of communitas, already mentioned above,71 offers an explanation of an
65 World Health Organization Ebola Response Team, ‘Ebola Virus Disease in West Africa—The First 9
Months of the Epidemic and Forward Projections’ (2014) 371 N Engl J Med 1481, and G Laurie and KG
Hunter, ‘Mapping, Assessing and Improving Legal Preparedness for Pandemic Flu in the United Kingdom’
(2009) 10 Med Law Int 101.
66 Thomassen (n 23) 99.
67 Szakolczai (n 49).
68 See, in particular, Girard (n 24).
69 See L Ellis, ‘Trickster: Shaman of the Liminal’ (1993) 5(4) Studies in American Indian Literatures 55. Also,
discussion in Thomassen (n 23) 103–05.
70 Turner, n 44, (1982), 104.
71 Turner, The Ritual Process (n 44) and text.
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altogether more positive experience. Different both to the idea of community72 or
even solidarity,73 communitas refers to a spontaneous sense of interconnectedness of
equals, experiencing the same process together: ‘[i]t is . . . a matter of giving recogni-
tion to an essential and generic human bond, without which there could be no soci-
ety’.74 As Stoller has said:
People in liminal states tend to be humble. They usually do what they are told –
often without complaint. They accept regimes of pain. They are reduced to a
common denominator so that they might be reconstructed. These processes
create an intense camaraderie, which washes away difference in age, social status,
and ethnicity. Turner called this camaraderie ‘communitas’.75
The immediate parallels with patients suffering a common disease, or of patient
groups rallying to collective action, should be obvious.76 However, as Edith Turner
points out of communitas, it is characterised by ‘ . . . its shyness and untouchability by
commercialization and institutionalization’.77 Communitas is powerful for its ability to
bind human beings through common experience, and its potential power is all the
stronger for its emergence in liminal spaces where existing social structures, hierar-
chies, power dynamics, and established institutions are called into question. Yet, at the
same time, this anti-structural and ethereal happening is entirely dependent on the
spatial and temporal limits of liminality itself. As she comments:
Communitas is exciting; it makes people able to organize and work together.
With this power, they will eventually develop organizational habits, structures,
and rules of behavior, and ranks and positions. These often work well if they re-
main on the human level; yet if they become overly law-bound, communitas will
bubble up again from below and question the old system.78
Communitas therefore deﬁes design and manufacture. It cannot be created artiﬁcially.
Moreover, this suggests important limitations on regulatory or legal regimes that at-
tempt to prescribe too closely the dynamics of human experience. This is not to say,
however, that liminal spaces cannot be facilitated for their productive potential, so
72 ibid 97. He prefers communitas to community because the latter implies ‘area of common living’ and this is
not necessary for communitas.
73 E Turner, Communitas: The Anthropology of Collective Joy (Palgrave Macmillan 2012) suggests that commu-
nitas should be distinguished from Durkheim’s solidarity: ‘ . . . which is a bond between individuals who are
collectively in opposition to some other group . . . But in the way communitas unfolds, people’s sense is
that it is for everybody- humanity, bar none. In communitas moments in the heart of revolutions it is the
same . . . ’, 5.
74 Turner, The Ritual Process (n 44) 97.
75 P Stoller, Stranger in the Village of the Sick: A Memoir of Cancer, Sorcery, and Healing (Beacon Press 2004)
184.
76 Again, this is not to suggest that this is naturally or necessarily the subjective experience. Other research,
currently being conducted on the Liminal Spaces Project with rare diseases patient groups, suggests that on
some occasions this kind of mobilisation can amplify disease burden: people have to deal with their own dis-
ease and that of others. Thanks to Samuel Taylor-Alexander for this point.
77 Turner (n 73) xii.
78 ibid, 4.
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long as this is on the understanding that that they are likely then to assume a dynamic
of their own. Examples of this in research and policy terms might be the Sandpit
Methods of early involvement in research and technology design79 which involve ‘ . . .
intensive discussion forums where free thinking is encouraged to delve into the prob-
lems on the agenda to uncover innovative solutions’.80 As for liminality itself, how-
ever, it is important to recall that Edith Turner’s analysis suggests that it is not
amenable to regulatory control or inﬂuence in the same way as other regulatory
approaches.81 Where, then, does this leave us?
To recap, an analytical framework of liminality appears to have the following
features:
• First and foremost, it is experiential;
• It is both potentially transformative and, normally, transitory;
• It is processual, having both spatial and temporal dimensions;
• It is characterised by uncertainty and has considerable disruptive potential;
• It is anti-structural in the sense of challenging existing and established structures;82
• Rites of passage therefore have value in guiding people through liminality;
• Independent actors can also assume a valuable role as guides through liminality;83
• Where rituals and actors are absent there is a greater risk of chaos and attenuated un-
certainty or permanent liminality;
• Other risks include unreﬂective mimic behavior, the rise of the trickster, and perpetual
schism, i.e. a failure to complete the process and achieve social re-integration;
• Ultimately, to pass through liminality is often to experience a change of status;
• This can be accompanied by the emergence of communitas by the persons involved,
but this is spontaneous and cannot be fabricated;
• Liminality can, then, be both challenging and empowering, but it is not easily amena-
ble to direct inﬂuence or control.
As a ﬁnal point, we must ask how—if at all—we can reconcile seemingly positive
experiences of liminality (Turner) with negative ones (Thomassen)? There is no de-
ﬁnitive answer, but a partial response seems to lie in the context for the creation of
liminality—did this arise from a crisis or from established ‘ritual’ process? Another im-
portant feature turns on the actors involved—who guides us through liminality and
with which intentions? All of these features have potential implications for health re-
search regulation.
79 See generally, N Doorn and others, ‘Early Engagement and New Technologies’ (2013) 16 Philos Eng and
Technol, Special Issue. See too, S Hogarth, ‘Regulatory Experiments and Transnational Networks: The
Governance of Pharmacogenomics in Europe and the United States’ (2012) 25(4) Innovation: The Eur J
Social Sci Res 441.
80 This is a typical deﬁnition taken from the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC)
website: <https://www.epsrc.ac.uk/funding/howtoapply/routes/network/ideas/whatisasandpit/> accessed
30 April 2016.
81 Turner, n 44, in his later works explored the importance and potential value of ’play’ in opening up the crea-
tive potential of liminal spaces.
82 This is not the same as saying that it is unstructured.
83 This function could also, partially, be addressed through policy and guidance.
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IV . LIMINALITY IN HEALTH RESEARCH REGULATION
These insights allow us to ask profound questions about the experiences of being in-
volved in health research regulation and hold real potential to reveal new understand-
ings about the serious challenges that persist in delivering acceptable and effective
regulation. Fundamentally, we can enquire: are there liminal spaces within the health
research regulatory space(s)? How can we recognise them? Indeed, who—or what—
is in a liminal space, and what does it mean to experience it? Finally, where does this
leave us on law, policy, and practice?
A. Are there Liminal Spaces within Health Research Regulation?
There are many features of health research that suggest that multiple liminal spaces ex-
ist within the regulatory environment, both for the human beings involved, and also
with respect to the objects that are so central to the regulatory enterprise.
1. Consent as a Liminal Process
As to the human experience, consider the practice of research recruitment. In the par-
adigmatic example of the clinical trial, the obtaining of consent takes pride of place.
This is a highly regulated and proscribed procedure in most legal systems, dictated as
to its form and function by legal architectures, such as the European Clinical Trials
Regulation,84 and the speciﬁc guidance of research ethics committees.85 Indeed, we
can see the consent process itself as a form of ritual involving established roles and
formalism—not least the signing of the consent form itself—designed to initiate per-
sons into a new social context. As Wilson has suggested:
Rituals reveal values at their deepest level . . . men express in ritual what moves
them the most, and since the form of expression is conventionalized [sic] and
obligatory, it is the values of the group that are revealed. I see in the study of rit-
uals the key to an understanding of the essential constitution of human
societies.86
The values underpinning the consent process have been well rehearsed elsewhere.87
Seeing it as a ritual, however, helps us to understand consent as a potentially transfor-
mative experience. In stark contrast to the ‘consent moment’ being a mere quasi-
contractual waiver of legal rights completed with the signing of the consent form, this
also adds meaning to talk about consent as process88 and requires us to consider the
multiple dimensions of such a process. From the experiential perspective, the process
is one of change of status for the persons involved: from patient to research partici-
pant; from healthy volunteer to community contributor etc. Moreover, this happens
outside law and in some sense is pre-law: no change in legal status occurs.
Nonetheless, liminality requires us to take this transformation and these multiple
84 n 4, ch V, arts 28–35.
85 See, in the UK context, Health Research Authority, Standard Operating Procedures for Research Ethics
Committees (v 6.1 2015). The term ‘consent’ appears no fewer than 209 times.
86 MWilson, ‘Nyahyusa Ritual and Symbolism’ (1954) 56(2) Am Anthropol 228, 241.
87 See Laurie and Postan (n 21) and associated texts.
88 n 22.
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subjectivities seriously. We can begin to do so by following through the entire process:
having crossed the threshold of giving consent, we should ask, what happens next and
what unmet needs still require regulatory attention? This arises as a consequence of
creating a liminal space for research participants by obtaining their consent to
research.
In terms of transformation, liminality can call into question people’s own identities.
Being recruited to health research means that people are no longer just a patient or or-
dinary citizen; they acquire a new and additional status of ‘research participant’.
Moreover, they are called upon to give something of themselves, whether this be sim-
ply their time, or also personal information and/or physical parts of their bodies, in-
cluding blood, DNA, tissue samples, and sometimes whole organs. Health research
requires participants to ‘actualise a new cross-domain identity’.89 They must do so in
a context and environment that are necessarily uncertain—this is the very deﬁnition
of why research is necessary and justiﬁable: it is about generating new knowledge
from the unknown.
More speciﬁcally, liminality focuses our attention on the temporal and spatial di-
mensions of this experience. For example, it leads us to ask: for how long does the
liminal phase last and what lies beyond it? While this might be a difﬁcult or impossible
question to answer because the timeframe will often be indeterminate, it is certainly
longer that the ‘consent moment’ itself, ie the mere signing of the consent form.
Indeed, a ﬁxation on consent as ‘the’ deﬁning moment in health research is misleading
if this leads us to ignore the longer-term experiential dimensions of becoming a re-
search participant. Moreover, liminality and its accompanying uncertainty and disrup-
tion should lead us to question whether mere voluntariness of participation is
sufﬁcient to protect and support research participants.90 The consent form might be
an important initial element of the rite of passage into the realm of research, but it
should signal the beginning—the threshold—of a change of status, not an end point
in itself. The subsequent transition and uncertainty are likely to leave research partici-
pants ill-equipped to navigate the new territory alone. Thus, as Ladge and others have
argued: ‘Liminality is not just a matter of knowledge and cannot be “informed away”,
as it is germane to socio-cultural processes and structures.’91
Rather, liminality suggests the likely importance of a role for a Master of
Ceremonies or Representative of Order to guide people through. We do ﬁnd exam-
ples of these kinds of roles in, for example, cohort studies that have dedicated teams
to liaise with cohort participants and to manage research projects involving cohort
members.92 A paradigm example is the Children of the 90s project, which has ‘[s]ince
the outset, . . . had [its] own ethics committee, which comprises clinicians, re-
searchers, lawyers and lay people, including study participants’. As the project states
89 See JJ Ladge, JA Clair and D Greenberg, ‘Cross-Domain Identity Transition during Liminal Periods:
Constructing Multiple Selves as Professional and Mother during Pregnancy’ (2012) 55(6) Academy of
Management J 1449.
90 See also, A Mol, The Logic of Care: Health and the Problem of Patient Choice (Routledge, 2008).
91 Ladge and others (n 89).
92 See, eg the Centre for Longitudinal Studies, Home of the 1958, 1970, Millennium and Next Steps Cohort
Studies:<http://www.cls.ioe.ac.uk/> accessed 30 April 2016.
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on its website: ‘[w]e involve participants in many aspects of the study and they have
their own advisory panels and online discussion forums’.93
A liminal perspective, then, suggests much more of a need to develop and support
ideas about authentic research partnerships between researchers and participants
alike.
2. Research as a Liminal Process
In acknowledging that liminality re-orients our attention towards the inter-
subjectivities at play, this should then also be extended to include interactions not just
between research subjects, but also between and with researchers and regulators too.
While it may not be the case that researchers are transformed in status terms, their en-
try into a liminal space of uncertainty—ie the research endeavour—still suggests the
value of a role for a guide. For example, the Health Research Authority has recently
appointed ofﬁcers known as Applications Managers to help guide researchers through
‘complex cases’ that straddle regulatory regimes.94 Equally, in the data linkage for re-
search domain, such as that represented by the Scottish Health Informatics
Programme,95 Research Coordinators work with researchers to reﬁne research ques-
tions and broker discussions with data controllers whose data are sought.96 These ex-
amples are in contrast to how many research ethics committees operate in most
health research contexts. They serve an important gatekeeper role only at the principal
threshold at the initial outer limit of the research landscape to ensure that robust up-
front ethical scrutiny is conducted. However, they are rarely involved in, or
empowered to, accompany researchers and participants through the research process
itself. However, if we see the research endeavour itself as a liminal process, then there
are many points of transition and transformation—multiple thresholds—of which ini-
tial ethics approval is only a beginning. Other thresholds include protocol deploy-
ment, generation and capture of research ﬁndings, publication and dissemination of
research results, and data storage and sharing for future research. As a result, core con-
cepts to which appeals are often made in this context, such as the ‘social value’ of re-
search, are potentially transformed multiple times and across multiple spaces
occupied by a range of (potentially constantly changing) actors.97 This contributes to
the difﬁcult of adequately deﬁning such concepts. Liminality allows us to engage with
this ﬂuidity and requires that we pay attention to what happens in these spaces in-
between.
For example, Stephens and others have provided evidence of what they term in-
stantiated regulation emerging in relation to the operation of the UK Stem Cell Bank.
93 See Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children: <http://www.bristol.ac.uk/alspac/researchers/>
accessed 30 April 2016.
94 Personal correspondence, HRA Applications Manager (2015).
95 The Scottish Health Informatics Programme, sponsored by the Wellcome Trust, ran from 2009–2013 and
was tasked with improving data linkage for research in Scotland: see,<http://www.scot-ship.ac.uk/sites/de
fault/ﬁles/Reports/SHIP_BLUEPRINT_DOCUMENT_ﬁnal_100712.pdf> accessed 30 April 2016.
96 The work of SHIP has now been absorbed into the UK-wide Farr Institute:<http://www.farrinstitute.org/
> accessed 30 April 2016.
97 I discuss this further with colleagues A Ganguli-Mitra, E Dove and S Taylor-Alexander in ‘Reconﬁguring
Social Value in Health Research Through the Lens of Liminality’, forthcoming.
Liminality and the Limits of Law in Health Research Regulation • 17
Their ﬁeldwork has revealed the emergence of ‘embedded regulators’ in everyday lab-
oratory practice in order to make regulatory documents ‘do-able’. That is, while regu-
lations and procedures prescribe certain conduct in order to conduct the research, the
rigid following of the letter-of-the-law actually hinders the research. The regulation is,
therefore, managed by the actors on the ground. The suggestion is that in this realm
there is a tension between (legal) text and (practical) context in giving effect to regu-
latory prescription for the ‘doing’ of research. The authors argue that ‘instantiated reg-
ulation’ emerges as ‘. . .a response to the interpretative ﬂexibility of regulatory texts’.98
To add an interpretation from the current analysis, this further suggests that the limi-
nal research space that is represented by the UK Stem Cell Bank requires actors to
lead researchers through the space if the research and the overall objective are to be
achieved. There is a role here, then, for regulatory stewardship.99 This is not something
that is currently captured by formal legal regimes. It is a phenomenon that is likely to
be revealed by the lens of liminality.
3. Regulated Objects as Liminal Entities
Finally, and as stated above in sub-Section IV A.1, involvement in health research usu-
ally requires participants to give of themselves, be this time, data, and/or tissue. The
separation of elements of self can represent a form of crisis, necessitating new ‘forms
of process’100 to deal with what occurs. The crisis is often seen as new threats to pri-
vacy, or to a lesser extent to identity, through loss of control. This is, in fact, where
law is most often called upon to intervene. The myth of liminality can once again as-
sist our understanding here when we appreciate that liminality might not only experi-
enced by persons. The ‘bounded objects’101 of health regulation described in Sections
I and II above—‘data’, ‘tissues’, embryos’ etc.—can also be seen in these terms.
Squier, for example, has argued that supernumerary embryos from artiﬁcial reproduc-
tion technologies represent ‘liminal lives’ that exist in ‘. . . that in-between or marginal
zone . . . neither discarded by-product nor valued human being, they are participants
in a rite of passage, between everyday life and a higher or different level of exis-
tence’.102 We can view ‘personal data’ and ‘human tissue’ in similar terms, and as de-
ﬁned respectively by the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Human Tissue Act 2004.
This is because what counts as ‘personal data’ or ‘human tissue’ can shift and change
over time depending on contexts for storage and use, and importantly, whether living
human subjects are identiﬁable from the data and tissue in question at any given
98 N Stephens, P Atkinson and P Glasner, ‘Documenting the Doable and Doing the Documented: Bridging
Strategies at the UK Stem Cell Bank’ (2011) 41(6) Social Studies of Science 791, 807.
99 See, eg the statutory obligation in New Zealand for government departments to exercise regulatory steward-
ship of the legislation administered by the department, where ‘stewardship’ is deﬁned as: ‘ . . . active plan-
ning and management of medium- and long-term interests, along with associated advice’: s 32 of the State
Sector Act 1988.
100 I am grateful to the insights of Paul Stenner for this expression used at a workshop of our Liminal Spaces
project, held in Edinburgh in May 2015, details here: <http://www.liminalspaces.ed.ac.uk/2015/07/01/
190/> accessed 29 July 2016. The event was held as part of the Wellcome Trust funded project
‘Confronting the Liminal Spaces of Health Research Regulation’, Award No: WT103360MA.
101 I use this term in contradistinction to the notion of ‘boundary objects’ developed by Star (n 14).
102 S Merrill Squier, Liminal Lives: Imagining the Human at the Frontiers of Biomedicine (Duke University Press
2004) 4.
18 • MEDICAL LAW REVIEW
moment. Thus, when persons are identiﬁable from data or tissue that are used or
stored, these materials are imbued with a speciﬁc signiﬁcance and regulated as such by
the respective pieces of legislation. If that identiﬁable link is broken, the laws cease to
have effect. It is often forgotten, however, that such links can be re-established over
time, as when the holder of anonymised data comes into possession of new data that
renders the subject identiﬁable once more.
Both the 1998 Act and the 2004 Act explicitly recognise the connection between
regulatory objects and the human subjects from whom they are derived. In both sys-
tems, consent is again a principal legitimating factor in dealings with the objects in
question. Equally, both deploy anonymisation as a mechanism to attempt to protect
the subjects from particular uses or dealings with the data or tissue that have been ex-
tracted. Thus, as noted previously, the ‘consent or anonymise’ paradigm is repli-
cated—or mimicked—across both systems. This mimetic behaviour is also predicted
by liminality, which suggests that copying in times of crisis is a common human re-
sponse. One such time of crisis involved the Bristol and Alder Hey scandals in the
1990s in which lay the origins of the Human Tissue Act.103 The ‘consent or anonym-
ise’ paradigm was already a well-accepted practice under the data protection regime
and it also found it way into the 2004 legislative response to the crisis around human
tissue.104
The added value of an analysis grounded in liminality is that it leads us to question
more generally the adequacy of these legalistic responses. Comments have already
been offered as to the limits of consent. As for anonymisation, the irony is that the at-
tempt to break connections with individual research participants perpetuates uncer-
tain liminal states, leading to permanent liminality.105 There has been much
discussion in the literature of the inadequacy of anonymisation techniques,106 and
many calls to recognise that identiﬁability is a relative and contingent term,107 de-
pending not only on techniques applied initially to data or samples but also subject to
change depending on new information or connections made over time. Thus, for the
purpose of this article if we were to combine a spatial and temporal analysis of ano-
nymisation—involving fragmentation of self and uncertain future possibilities—it
leads us to understand anonymisation as a process occurring in a liminal space with
respect to data and/or tissue. Moreover, this analysis can help to explain ongoing anx-
iety about data/tissue uses removed from persons.
In its attempt to create ‘bounded objects’ as the appropriate focus for regulatory at-
tention, the law seems to overlook the experience for the data or tissue subject. An al-
ternative regulatory perspective would be to recognise and acknowledge the enduring
connection between subject-object, and the potential identity-signiﬁcant implications
of this. This does not necessarily mean that research participants be granted a
103 DHall, ‘Reﬂecting on Redfern: What CanWe Learn from the Alder Hey Story?’ (2001) 84 Arch Dis Child 455.
104 For criticisms, see Academy of Medical Sciences, Personal Data for Public Good: Using Health Information
in Medical Research (2011); Academy of Medical Sciences, A New Pathway for the Regulation and
Governance of Health Research (2012); R Thomas and MWalport, ‘Data Sharing Review Report’ (2008).
105 This concept is discussed further by Horvarth (n 23) and Szakolczai (n 49).
106 See Ohm (n 27).
107 Lowrance (n 28).
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continuing control right over their data or tissue,108 nor does it mean that anonymisa-
tion becomes a redundant security measure. Rather, it suggests that more attention
should be directed to addressing participants’ expectations when they contribute to
the research endeavour. This might include, for example, the deployment of traceabil-
ity mechanisms to alert participants to particular uses of their contributions. An exam-
ple of this is the sms-text system used in Sweden to inform donors when their blood
has been used.109 In the same way that the person’s status undergoes transformation
during health research, so too do their donations. Arguably, the expectation cannot be
that tissue/data remain unchanged. Rather, these entities become a valuable research
resource to be used for the public good. Due acknowledgement of the achievement of
such an objective at the level of one’s own participation in research could go a long
way to promoting genuinely communal interests: between beings.
B. What does Liminality Reveal About care.data?
Let us return to the events surrounding care.data, as outlined in Section II, to bring
this analysis together. What does liminality reveal about what occurred? First, and per-
haps most tellingly, it was law itself that created the liminal space. It will be recalled
that the Health and Social Care Act 2012 established the Health and Social Care
Information Centre with legal authority to require patient data from GP surgeries.
Neither GPs nor patients were actively involved in assenting to these processes.
Rather, the legal regime mimicked a version of the ‘consent or anonymise’ paradigm.
The likely effects on patients of being thrust into a new status of research ‘subjects’110
have been addressed above, but what of the GPs? They too were required to ‘actualise
a new cross-domain identity’111—moving from a status of primary care provider to
acting also as agent of the state concerned with a far wider range of considerations
than simply patient health. This raises the prospect of the role of ‘trickster’ in liminal
terminology. Liminal spaces can be dangerous not only because they create uncertain-
ties and disturb established social structures, but also because they leave the people
who occupy those spaces vulnerable to deception and mis-leading actors. In contrast
to the Master of Ceremonies or the Representative of Order, the trickster does not
act as an independent guide through liminal space; rather he acts for his own interests,
or at least not in the interests of those experiencing liminality.112 Liminality suggests
that there was a double bind operating with care.data. From the patient perspective, it
cast suspicion on GPs as possible tricksters; and from the GPs’ perspective, who also
experienced liminality, they were left without a guide through the new liminal space.
Indeed, we might even suggest here that law itself was the trickster by creating a
108 cf J Walle, ‘The Legal Status of Body Parts: A Framework’ (2011) 31(4) OJLS 783.
109 The Independent, ‘Blood Donors in Sweden Get a Text Message Whenever Their Blood Saves Someone’s
Life’, 10 June 2015, available at< http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/blood-donors-in-
sweden-get-a-text-message-whenever-someone-is-helped-with-their-blood-10310101.html> accessed 30
April 2016.
110 The term is used deliberately here in contradistinction to volunteer research ‘participants’.
111 n 89, above.
112 The paradigmatic example of the Trickster is the savior dictator who emerges from the context of a country
in crisis to save the day. Consider the experiences of Germany in the post-World War One era and the rise
of the Chancellor who took over power in 1933. It is often in the Trickster’s interests that a chaotic, liminal
state continues.
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liminal space and subsequent crisis and for failing to provide suitable rites of passage
through the new landscape. In this example, law led people into liminality, not out of
it. It provoked crisis, rather than resolved it.
A further observation follows from this. It would neither be a sufﬁcient nor com-
plete response simply to better inform patients and GPs, nor indeed to secure their
consent to such an enterprise. While there are strong ethical imperatives to suggest
that this ought to happen as a minimum, the creation of liminality with respect to pa-
tient data use and GP practice requires a longer-term, supported, guided, and
experience-focused plan of action if an initiative such as care.data has a chance to suc-
ceed. If this does not happen then the third danger of liminality—division—is likely
to prevail. The schism in question here could occur at multiple levels: patients with re-
spect to GPs; GPs with respect to employers and the NHS; researchers with respect
to regulators; and so on. Moreover, the failure to recognise the ongoing subject-object
relationship, and to address associate expectations, is equally likely to signal failure for
any re-launch of care.data. Liminality thus throws into stark relief the reasons why the
mere rendering of processes as ‘lawful’ is inadequate in, and of, itself.
The subsequent plan of action for care.data can be assessed in such terms. In May
2014, the care.data Programme Board agreed to work with up to 500 practice
‘Pathﬁnders’ to test, evaluate and reﬁne all care.data technical and communication
processes.113 The Programme adopted a ‘co-production’ approach to initial GP and
patient-facing material. Moreover, opt-out was then clearly embedded for all citizens
to be approached. The Programme further identiﬁed a list of issues considered to be
essential to demonstrate the success of the Pathﬁnder stage,114 as well as a further set
of questions required to be addressed adequately. Central to this were questions from
GPs about what support would be available to ensure they discharged their duties.
The preceding analysis would suggest that this plea to be guided through is of particu-
lar importance. There is some irony, in fact, that the initiative was called Pathﬁnder
since the path through this new regulatory space is far from clear. Furthermore, from
a citizens’ perspective, there remained questions about the transformative potential of
their new status as citizen contributors. Liminality would suggest that more express
consideration be given to what this might mean and how citizens experience this.
This might include, for example, ongoing engagement and feedback of beneﬁts as part
of a process of involvement (rather than simply the co-production of up-front informa-
tion). Indeed, at the time of going to press, two reports were published recommend-
ing a consent/opt-out approach to data sharing in NHS England.115 On the same day
113 The Independent Information Governance Oversight Panel’s Report to the care.data Programme Board on
the care.data Pathﬁnder Stage (2014), available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/up
loads/attachment_data/ﬁle/389219/IIGOP_care.data.pdf> accessed 30 April 2016.
114 The list was: (i) Use of the data and clear explanation of purposes; (ii) A secure data facility to allow ap-
proved applicants to use and analyse data; (iii) Transparency—HSCIC to update and maintain its register
of data releases; (iv) Conﬁdentiality—The Code of Practice and fair processing information to be provided
on the HSCIC website; (v) Control of data—NHS England and HSCIC to be joint Data Controllers; (vi)
Business case development—to be developed and endorsed by the Programme Board before data extrac-
tion; (vii) Evaluation—a full evaluation at the end of the Pathﬁnder stage will inform the wider rollout of
care.data. At the time of submission the rollout had not yet occurred (May 2016).
115 National Data Guardian for Health and Care, Review of Data Security, Consent and Opt-Outs, 6 July 2016, available
here: <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ﬁle/535024/data-security-
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the Department of Health and George Freeman MP announced that the care.data
programme would be closed.116 Public consultation on the proposed approach would
follow.
C. What does Liminality not do?
It is important to offer some caveats about the limits of this analysis through the lens
of liminality. This is not an empirically grounded study. Thus, to reiterate there is no
assertion that patients, GPs, or other actors actually or always experience uncertainty
or anxiety with respect to health research. Nor is it crucial to the value of the analysis
to claim that these experiences necessarily must occur before liminality can provide
useful insights. Rather, an understanding of liminal spaces and liminal experience has
a reorienting effect on our perspectives about what it means to be involved in health
research. We must also recall both the perpetual and the ethereal nature of the myth
of liminality. This suggests that any regulatory response is doomed if this is not taken
into account, as the ﬁnal section discusses below.
V. IMAGINING LIMINAL REGULATORY SPACES
The remaining task is to consider how we might reimagine regulatory spaces in health
research through the lens of liminality, and to ask what might be lost when we fail to
pay attention to the spaces in-between. Accordingly, we can revisit the characterisa-
tion of legal regulatory space given in Section II above, as follows:
1. The attention of law and regulation on ‘bounded objects’ such as personal data
and tissue should be questioned on at least two counts: ﬁrst, for the fallacy of at-
tempting to ‘ﬁx’ such regulatory objects, and to divorce them from their source
and the potential impact on identity for the subjects themselves; and, second,
for the failure to see such objects as also experiencing liminality. Both of these
points suggest a need to approach the management of regulation in processual
and potentially transformative terms.
2. There is a plurality of research ‘subjects’ that experience the transitoriness and
uncertainty of the liminal spaces of health research regulation. Thus, while it is
ﬁt and proper that due attention be paid to research participants and their expe-
riences (including the status change that they undergo when law and practice
convert them from mere citizens to agents of the public good), there is also a
need to avert to the impact on researchers and regulators, especially if they are
thrust into new regulatory spaces by state or institutional policies.
3. Equally, the primacy of consent as an individualistic concern should be chal-
lenged for its failure to provide complete protection or recognition of the full
range of interests at stake within liminal experience. In particular, those interests
extend beyond atomistic individuals. Given the socially-oriented nature of much
review.PDF> accessed 6 July 2016. Also, Care Quality Commission, Safe Data, Safe Care, 6 July 2016, available
here:<http://www.cqc.org.uk/sites/default/ﬁles/20160701%20Data%20security%20review%20FINAL%20for%
20web.pdf> accessed 6 July 2016.
116 See Written Statement to Parliament, Review of Health and Care Data Security and Consent, 6 July 2016,
available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/review-of-health-and-care-data-security-and-con
sent> accessed 6 July 2016.
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health research, we should also consider the likely liminality experienced by the
patient groups, communities, and publics more widely generated by health re-
search as a public enterprise. If citizens experience this as an apparently haphaz-
ard, unguided, and potentially deceptive encounter, then liminality suggests a
chaotic response will ensue. In contrast, it should be recognised that liminal
spaces can be created to support the active involvement of groups in effective re-
search design and regulation. Where communitas might arise—which is by no
means guaranteed—this can have a particularly powerful inﬂuence, but the
temptation should be resisted to attempt to manufacture it by design.
4. The role of consent as a legitimating event in health research regulation should
be recognised as merely a threshold moment at the beginning of an attenuated
experience. Consent should be re-envisioned as a process that takes on the form
of ritual; there is a need to pay more attention to the transformation of status
that consent signals and to provide more support through the process of
experiencing involvement in health research regulation.
5. In addition, regulatory regimes should be alert to the risks associated with limi-
nal spaces. The common regulatory response of ‘Consent or Anonymise’ can be
seen as an example of mimicry when faced with crisis; equally, too, law’s role in
provoking crisis (Trickster) rather than resolving crisis (Representative of
Order) must be carefully examined. The failure to recognise these risks can
eventually lead to schism within relevant communities, and a state of permanent
liminality, uncertainty, and distrust. Thus, in this sense, an analysis of liminality
also explains what is at stake in the perpetual pursuit of the public’s trust in
health research regulation.
Ultimately, more attention should be paid to process and transformation within the
regulatory spaces of health research regulation. If we return to the origins of the dis-
cussion of liminality, and the phenomenon ﬁrst identiﬁed by van Gennep, we are re-
minded that liminality is the middle process of a three-part pattern of experience: (i)
separation from existing order, (ii) liminality, and (iii) re-integration into a new world.
The aim is completion of this tri-partite process. And this begs the question: what
might be the New World in health research regulation? In his discussion of Liminality
and The Modern, the answer for Thomassen is to return to stability and normality:
This happens by forging a new identity in the individual case, reﬂecting shift of
one’s position within the social order; while in the case of society new common
bonds are formed through the cathartic experience of communitas.117 Both pro-
cesses involve the social and the asocial, and re-draw the boundaries between
them.118
Put otherwise, the objective should be to bring people successfully out of the other
side of liminality. If, then, we recognise and accept the disruptive potential of health
research as creating liminal spaces—including through the law itself—then the
117 Citing Turner, The Ritual Process (n 44).
118 Thomassen (n 23) 92.
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responsibility is to consider what can be done to support people through liminal pe-
riods. And as emphasised in Section IV, this applies as much to researchers and regu-
lators as to research participants.119 Self-evidently, there is no single answer to what
all of this means across the vast range of research activity. Rather the triadic analysis
requires serious reﬂection on when and where re-integration occurs and what this
looks like. If we are not clear about this part of the process and do not support it ade-
quately, then uncertainty is likely to endure; in turn, it is likely to foster distrust and
other negative consequences.
Fruitful avenues to explore include the enduring appeal of ritual in contemporary
society. We can, therefore, distinguish between two forms of liminality:
(i) Ceremonial liminality that is subject to rites of passage that guide people
through liminal spaces or time periods, and which lend themselves to an inde-
pendent representative of order; and
(ii) Spontaneous liminality, which is unforeseen and resulting from crisis.120
Effective regulatory mechanisms need to envisage both of these eventualities, and to
plan accordingly. The respective strategies must, necessarily, be quite distinct. The crucial
reﬂective point for stakeholders accordingly becomes: how do current regulatory appara-
tuses structure process and transformation, and what are the beneﬁts and shortcomings
of this? We could consider, for example, the recent addition in the Care Act 2014, men-
tioned above, which requires the Health Research Authority (HRA) to appoint a com-
mittee for the purpose of giving advice to the HRA itself, the Secretary of State, and the
Health and Social Care Information Centre in connection with the processing of conﬁ-
dential patient information. This committee might well explore with stakeholders the ex-
periential dimensions of data use with a view to informing the advice that it will give.
Beyond providing a clear guide through the experience, researchers and regulators
could work more proactively to support citizens in recognising the collective and po-
tentially transformative experience of becoming a research participant. This is with the
caveat that it is not on the basis of engendering such experience into each and every
citizen, while recognising that experience is at once individual and collective. A com-
mon feature of accounts of liminality is that it is a shared experience. Normatively, the
potential power of liminality arises from a common human happening that is a great
leveller—it puts us all in the same boat. We can recognise value in ourselves, and in
others, and in the status change that is being brought about. If that change is to con-
tribute to a collective, common good, then liminality has a tentative role to play.
Opportunities could be provided of access to positive models of involvement in health
research, as well as occasions to share and learn from the experiences of other research
participants,121 researchers, and regulators.
119 n 94, and text.
120 Further gratitude is due to Stenner for this distinction, (n 100). An additional liminal category might be en-
tities that are between established ontological well-regulated categories. For example, consider biobricks
which neither emerge from crisis nor are they in need of guidance. These are DNA sequences designed to
comply with multiple assembly engineering standards in a effort to build higher-order biological systems:
see further the Biobricks Foundation, available at< http://biobricks.org/> accessed 30 April 2016.
121 See Ladge and others (n 89) 1467.
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Finally, what of the relationship between law and liminality in all of this? The pre-
ceding analysis would suggest that this is an uneasy union. When spontaneous liminal-
ity is triggered by crisis—however deﬁned—then law is often called upon to ﬁll the
void. There is a plethora of examples of this happening in the medico-legal sphere,
and the reaction is understandable because law can represent certainty, structure, and
directed agency, while spontaneous liminality is typiﬁed by uncertainty, anti-structure,
and an absence of agency (or even a perceived failure of agency). If we seek to cast
law as the Representative of Order, we must equally be alert to it assuming the guise
of Trickster, or at least that it is perceived as such (as the example of care.data likely il-
lustrates). However, even when the motive behind legal intervention is well inten-
tioned, we should not lose sight of the impositional character of law, which, by its
nature, seeks to establish structures, ﬁx regulatory objects, assign responsibilities, and
attribute liabilities.122 A regulatory space that is constructed and deﬁned solely in such
terms misses something very crucial in-between. This analysis suggests that it is possi-
ble to envision in-between spaces where people experience unsettling—but also po-
tentially empowering—changes of status and inﬂuence. Such uncontrolled spaces—in
the sense of spaces that support and facilitate genuinely open-ended engagement and
interaction—can be afﬁrming and productive, and could take regulation in new and
more effective directions. The real question for law is whether it can envision and sup-
port the creation of genuinely liminal regulatory spaces that go against its own inher-
ent tendencies, and yet which, as has been demonstrated herein, would capture
something very human about the conduct of human health research.
VI . CONCLUSION
This article has examined what it means to miss the spaces in-between the current reg-
ulatory spaces created in the health research environment. In contradistinction to
law’s tendency to create legal silos of regulatory attention around artiﬁcial and ﬁxed
‘objects’, the argument has been made that we must reimagine regulatory space and
time as an holistic enterprise which places human experience at the centre and which
focuses equally on the human subject. The concept of liminality allows us to do so,
and it reveals a plethora of insights about the workings and challenges of current
health research regimes. The ironic insight is that current structures, themselves, cre-
ate the liminal experiences discussed above. However, if we fail to see involvement in
health research as an essentially transformative experience, then we blind ourselves to
many of the human dimensions of health research. More worryingly, we run the risk
of overlooking deeper explanations about why some projects fail and why the entire
enterprise continues to operate sub-optimally. While this is not to suggest that liminal-
ity provides complete solutions, it does invite radical rethinking about how health re-
search is experienced. This, in turn, demands that law and legal architectures
accommodate liminal regulatory spaces, even when these appear antithetical to the
commonly accepted social roles of law itself.
122 Poignantly, consider the words of Szakolczai (n 39) 31: ‘Institutions, laws, and structures will always be deﬁ-
cient, failing us just when we need the most protection and security.’
Liminality and the Limits of Law in Health Research Regulation • 25
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This article is the product of a Wellcome Trust Senior Investigator Award entitled
‘Confronting the Liminal Spaces of Health Research Regulation’ (Award No:
WT103360MA). An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the HeLEX
Conference, Translation in Healthcare, University of Oxford, June 2015. I am grateful
to the Liminal Spaces Project colleagues for their input: Edward Dove, Isabel Fletcher,
Agomoni Ganguli-Mitra, Catriona McMillan, Nayha Sethi, Annie Sorbie and Samuel
Alexander-Taylor. In addition, I am especially thankful for the continued support and
wise counsel of Mark Taylor and Niamh Nic Shuibhne, and for the comments of the
anonymous referees. All errors are mine alone.
26 • MEDICAL LAW REVIEW
